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THE BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE DOCTRINE
FREDERICK G. McKEAN*
The concept of convenience is, in all likelihood, one of the most prolific
sources of law, for we find vast bodies of doctrine based upon notions of con-
venience; such as, the rule imposing the burden of proof or onus probandi upon
him who substantially alleges the affirmative of a proposition; the rule de min-
imis non curat lex; divers maxims; and numerous rules of presumption. Speci-
fically the subject of these notes is a principle developed in English equity,
probably indigenous; but at the same time the student of comparative law may
observe a parallel growth in at least a few civil law jurisdictions such as
Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland and South Africa.
At the outset of this discussion it must be acknowledged that there is a
conflict of authority as to the solution of numerous questions involving the
subject of this paper. So much is this the case that committees framing moot
court cases can find much suitable material in this topic which is ad-
mirably suitable for debate. If however, we bear in mind the principle voiced
by the brilliant Sir George Jessel. that the rules of courts of equity were in-
vented for the purpose of securing the better administration of justice;1 it may
prove possible to extract a few rules, characteristic of the practical working
of the doctrine, which will be serviceable in dealing with questions as to the
applicability of the principle. Employing the Jessel observation as a pole-star
it is fairly obvious that the balance of convenience principle is seldom prim-
ary or fundamental, but is generally subsidiary or accessory, and frequently
unnecessary to the disposition of reported cases in which the expression "bal-
ance of convenience" has been employed as a stock phrase. Furthermore,
there are many conditions in which it would be manifestly unjust and squarely
opposed to current morality and present-day public policy for a chancellor
even to consider comparative convenience or inconvenience where injunctive
relief is sought. Hence it is not surprising to find a preponderance of author-
ity supporting the proposition that in equitable proceedings the balance of con-
*LL.B., Harvard University, 1897; Judge of District Court of Virgin Islands of United
States, 1920-1924. Member of Pennsylvania Bar. Contributor to numerous legal periodicals.
'In re Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696, 710 (Eng. 1879).
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venience doctrine does not enter, as between the parties to a suit, where it
clearly appears that there has been a wanton invasion of legal rights, ir-
remediable by a common law action.2 Most assuredly a wrongdoer is in no
position to object to a curb upon his illegal activities because of the expense
or loss of profits which might ensue. This widely accepted rule that the bal-
ance of convenience doctrine does not apply to irreparable invasion of legal
rights is not only ethical, but in addition, is based upon sound considerations
of public policy. Numerous aphorisms support it, such as: No man shall
profit by his own wrong; flat justitia; equum et bonum est lex legum; and many
others which readily suggest themselves and make equal appeal to the lawyer
and to the layman. The criterion is whether a legal remedy would be in-
adequate, and that is the case only where the injury done or threatened is
irreparable, or of a continuous or recurrent nature. In other words, a prelim-
inary injunction will be granted under the pressure of a "present urgent neces-
sity," where the damage threatened to be done is, from an equitable point of
view, of an irreparable character.
Adverting to the Jessel doctrine that the rules of courts of equity were
invented for the better administration of justice; it is clear that it would be op-
2Texas 6 N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Ry. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 571 (1930); Mobile & 0. Ry. Co.
v. Zimmem, 206 Ala. 37; 89, 89 So. 475, 16 A. L. R. 1352 (1921); Peterson v. City, 119 Cal.
387 (1897); Felsenthal v. Warung. 140 Cal. App. 119, 129 (1919); Baldocchi v. Four Fifty
Sutter Corporation, 18 Pac. (2d) 682 (Cal. 1933); Kane v. Porter, 77 Col. 257 (1925); Banby
v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109 (1927); Dick v. Sears-Roebuck b Co., 115 Conn. 122 (1932);
Chambers v. Cin. 6 Ga. Ry. Co., 69 Ga. 320, 323 (1882); Wente v. Commonwealth Trust
Co., 232 111. 526 (1908); Rosehill Cem. Co. v. City, 252 Il1. 11, 30 (1933): State Board Tax
Commissioners v. Belt Ry. etc. Co., 191 Ind. 282, 291 (1901); O'Brien v. Murphy, 189 Mass.
353 (1905); Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co., 203 Mass. 448 (1909); Summerfield Co.
v. Prime Furniture Co., 242 Mass. 149, 155 (1922); Ives. v. Edison, 124 Mich. 402 (1900);
Bainton v. Clark Equipment Co., 210 Mich. 402 (1920); Wheeler v. McIntyre, 55 Mont. 295,
303 (1918); Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N. J. Eq. 616 (1892); Delaware, Lack. 18 West. Ry.
Co. v. Breckenbridge, 57 N. J. Eq. 154 (1918); Tribune Assn. v. Simmonds, 104 At. 386. (N. J.
Eq. 1918); Rutr v. Huelsenbeck, 109 N. J. Eq. 273 (1931); Citrona v. Columbia Theater, 151
At. 467 (N. J. Eq. 1930); Storck v. El. Ry., 131 N. Y 5, 14 (1892); Sammons v. City, 70
N. Y. Supp. 284 (1901); Halo v. Burns, 91 NA Y. Supp. 929 (1905); Whalen v. Union Bag
& Paper Co., 208 N. Y. 1 (1913); Hard v. Blue Points Co., 156 N. Y. Supp. 465 (1915);
Smith v. Graham, 217 N. Y. 655 (1916); Fraser v. City. 81 Ore. 92, 158 Pac. 514, 9 A. L. R.
614 (1920); Hansen v. Crouch, 98 Ore. 141, 193 Pac. 454 (1920); Sullivan v. Jones 8 Laugh-
lin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540 (1904): Baugh v. Bergdoll. 227 Pai 420 (1910); Kestner v. Home-
opathic, etc. Hospital, 245 Pa. 326 (1914); Weiss 6 Maen v. Greenberg, 101 Pa. Super. 24
(1930); Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 483 (1930); Town of Bristol v. Palmer, 83 Vt. 54,
74 Ad. 332. 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881 (1909); Cooke v. Gilbert, 8 Times L. R. 382 (Eng.
1892); Lindsay v. Le Sueur, 11 D. L. R. 411 (Can. 1913); Contra : Donovan v. Kissena Park
Corp., 168 N. Y. S. 1035 (1918).
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pressive, inequitable, and productive of great mischief to grant the drastic
remedy of injunction (which is never given where there is an available legal
remedy as complete and efficient as that which equity could afford)3 when
there has been only a technical or unsubstantial invasion of right.4 This does
not mean that the maxim de minimis non curat lex is applicable in such a case,
for where a legal right is invaded and a legal remedy is necessary to its vindi-
cation the law will imply damages even where it is impossible to compute them
by monetary standards,- and will not hesitate to resort to such implication
where, in point of fact such invasion has yielded a pecuniary benefit to a plain-
tiff., Land is per se of peculiar value and of unique character,' and an en-
croachment upon rights of real estate is not deemed trivial or unsubstantial.
Consequently equity will take jurisdiction to prevent an unauthorized user
from ripening intq a right by prescription,8 even though an invasion of right,
such as an obstruction of an easement, has involved a large investment of
capital;" and will not relegate a complainant in any such case to an action of
damages, thereby permitting the perpetrator of a wrongful act to make a
forced purchase of his neighbor's rights. ° To hold otherwise would involve.
the assumption by a court of a political power akin to that of eminent domain.
Where there is danger of unjust and irreparable mischief being done
through an erroneous grant or refusal of an injunction, a natural safeguard
would be a careful consideration of the balance of convenience or inconven-
ience, in order to subserve and not defeat substantial justice. (In this con-
nection, it should not be overlooked that, ordinarily, the rights of a defendant
are protected by the bond if an injunction should issue, while there is no such
safeguard to a plaintiff if an injunction should be improperly refused). Ac-
cordingly, where a right is doubtful or disputed, the balance of convenience
3Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 281 (1909).
4Frost v. City, 181 Cal. 22, 31 (1919); Ontjes v. Bagley. 250 N. W. 17 (Iowa, 1933);
Stock v. City, 155 Mich. 375 (1909); Stampp v. Board of Supervisors, 252 N. Y. Supp. 303,
308 (1931); Naun v. Raimist, 225 N. Y. 307, 319 (1931); Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 74 Ohio
St. 160 (1906); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293 (1891); Chartiers Block
Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 299 (1893); Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338
(1895); Behrens v. Richards, (1905) 2 Ch. 614; British Ry. be. Co. v. London County Coun-
cil, et al., (1922) 2 K. B. 260.
5Railway v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364 (18671: Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552 (1869); Railway
v. Allen, 53 Pa. 276 (1866).
6Dewire v. Hanley, 79 Conn. 454, 65 Atd. 563 (1907).
7Moss V. Jourdan, 129 Miss. 598, 615 (1922).
STownsend v. Bell, 17 N. Y. Supp. 210 (1891).
8Hard v. Blue Points Co., 156 N. Y. Supp. 465 (1915).
loShelfer v. Electric Lighting Co., (1895) 1 Ch. 287, 322.
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or inconvenience is an important factor in determining whether to grant or re-
fuse a preliminary or interlocutory injunction, and in such cases a decree,
when granted, is customarily, so framed as to maintain the status quo or pre-
vent irremediable mischief pending the final disposition of a suit.1  Wherever
the grant or refusal of a preliminary or interlocutory injunction depends upon
the consideration of the preponderance of inconvenience, the onus is upon the
plaintiff of showing that his inconvenience would exceed that of the defend-
ant,'12 and where an equity proceeding has reached the stage where the ques-
tion arises as to the grant of permanent relief to a plaintiff, the petitioner must
establish every disputed fact essential to his title to relief.13
An important category of cases in which the balance of convenience is
frequently found to be important, is that in which a conflict of interests is in-
volved. Valuable assistance in the solution of such questions has been furn-
ished by the development of rules as to the relative weight of different classes
of rights. Thus, for illustration, the law attributes to an enjoyment right a
higher status than that of the injuring use right, 14 rights of habitation are
deemed superior to rights of trade,-' and human rights are valued more highly
than material ones.
16
Taking it by and large, the jurisprudence of English speaking people lays
special emphasis upon the protection of the individual against governmental
or community oppression as well as against attempted wrong-doing by in-
dividuals; and, where necessary this protection will be accorded by means of
that branch of the law of remedies which is known in our system of laws as
equity jurisprudence. This principle is considered so sacred in American
"Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 537 (1885): New England Mortgage Security Co. v.
Powell, 97i Ala. 483, 489 (1893); Castleman v. Knight, 215 Ala. 429 (1927); Mayor, etc. of
Wilmington v. Addicks, 47 AtI. 366, 374 (Del. 1900); Everett v. Tabor, 119 Ga. 128 (1903);
Loomis v. Collins, 272 Ill. 221, 236 (1916); Munson v. Tryon, 7 Phila. 395. 400 (1867);
Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 59, 59 L, R. A. 556 (1903); Cory v. Railway Co., ,3 Hare 593.
600, 601 (Eng. 1844); Clowes v. Beck, 13 Beav. 347 (Eng. 1851); Read v. Richards, 45 L. T.
54, 57, 58, 59 (Eng. 1881); York Publishing Co. v. Coulter & Wayside Publishers Ltd., 24
0. L. R. 384 (Can. 1913); Playter v. Lucas, 51 0. L. R. 492 (Can. 1921); Canadian Radiator
Co. v. Anonyme de Construction, 6 Quebec Pr. Rep. 354 (1904).
12Child v. Douglas, 5 De G. M. 6 G., 739, 742 (Eng. 1854).
"sWorld Realty Co. v. Omaha, 113 Neb. 390. 203 N. W. 574. 40 A. L. R. 1313 (1925):
Chizek v. City, 253 N. W. 441 (Neb. 1934).
24Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 483 (1930).
"5Wente v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 232 Ii. 526, 83 N. E. 1049 (1908); Poskey v.
Cumberland Realty Co., 35 Misc. 50, 70 N. Y. S. 1125 (1901); Sullivan v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540 (1904); Lavner v. Light 6 Water Co., 74 Wash. 373. 133 Pac. 592
(1913); Rogers v. Lumber Co., 117 Wis. 5 (1903).
leStead v. Fortner, 255 I11. 408, 478 (1912); Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475 (1930).
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jurisdictions that we frequently find equity powers exercised to enjoin the
threatened enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, "whenever it is essen-
tial. in order to protect property rights and the rights of persons against in-
juries otherwise irremediable. '17  Whether or not an injury is irreparable de-
pends upon the completeness of a remedy at law, and not upon the magnitude
of the damage inflicted.'- This may be where the wrongs are of a repeated
and continuing character, or occasion damages conjecturable in amount and
incommensurate by any accurate standard.- The term "irreparable" has been
defined as that "which cannot be repaired, retrieved,, put back again, atoned
for.' 2 0 In a negative form it has been phrased that an injury which can be
fully compensated in money is not an irreparable injury.2 Probably the
most familiar class of cases illustrative of the jural concept of irreparability is
that wherein money damages are not equivalent to the interest threatened,
such as land, heirlooms and other property of unique character. 2 1 Other ex-
amples of irreparable invasion of right, may be found in cases of continuous
trespass by public officers;21 unlawful interference with business
2 4 -secondary
boycott;2 5 interference by a sub-contractor with the work of his building con-
tractor; 8 invasion of right by an insolvent; zT disclosure of confidential inform-
ation or analogous breach of faith;28 and, in general, any cases wherein no
certain pecuniary standards exist for the measurement of unlawful damage
'7Champton Refg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S, 210, 238 11932).
18Winslow v. Fleischner, 110 Ore. 554, 563 (1924).
19Stuart v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 285 Pa. 102 (1926).
20Gause v,. Perkins, 3 Jones Eq. I77, 179 (N. C. 1857).
"'Turnpike Road v. Steam Company, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 354 (1888).
"2Kane v. Porter, 77 Colo. 257 (1925); Schavoir v. Re-Bonded Leather Co., 104 Conn. 472
(1926); Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 218 (1910); Prosley v. Cumberland Realty
Co., 35 Misc. 50, 70 N. Y. Supp. 1125 (1901); Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 70 W. Va. 68,
73 S. E. 82, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 262 (1911); Wilson v. City, 39 Wis. 160 (1875); Read v.
Richardson, 45 L. T. 54, 57, 58, 59 (Eng. 1881).
2"Rutr v. Huelsenback, 109 N. J. Eq., 273 (1931); Hale v. Burns, 91 N. Y. Supp. 929
(1905).
24Scherman v. Stern, 93 N. J. Eq., 626, 631 (1922); Flaccus v. Smyth, 199 Pa. 128, 136
(1901).
Z5Stuhmer v. Korman, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1934).
"'McFarland v. Quinn, 188 N. C. 645 (1924).
2"Friedberg v. McClary, 113 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 309 (1917); Button's Admr. v. Hill, 27
N. J. Eq., 756 (1903); Hodgson v. Duce, 28 L. T. 0. S. 155 (Eng. 1856).
"'Schavoir v. Leather Co., 104 Conn. 472 (1926); Stone v, Goss, 65 N. J. Eq. 756 (1903);
Prince Albert v. Strange. 1 Mac. & G. 55 (Eng. 1849); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch,
D. 545 (Eng, 1888); King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917).
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done or threatened.29 Notwithstanding all this, numerous syllabi of reported
decisions unequivocally set forth that the balance of convenience doctrine ap-
plies to controversies where equitable relief is sought for wanton and irrepar-
able invasion of right; but it is a matter of common observation that a sylla-
bus, like a newspaper head-line, frequently falls short of being a dependable
precis of its subject-matter. Consequently we often find in the reports, in-
stances of equities disentitling a complainant to relief, overlooked in the head-
notes, and thereby leading a searcher to infer that a chancellor has ruled a
possible inconvenience to a wrongdoer to be of more importance than the
threatened wrong to his victim, by stressing the balance of convenience prin-
ciple. In many such instances the head-note digester has abstracted discus-
sions of comparative injury and ignored more important factors of the ratio
decidendi, thus employing language too broad for the basic facts involved.
Furthermore there are reported decisions stressing comparative injury which
satisfy "the psychological source of all law, the feeling of legal' right (Rechts-
ge[uhl) "30 in their results, although very faint allusion to vital equities sup-
porting the opinions appears in the discussion, possibly due to a conviction
that the importance of such factors is too obvious to require extended com-
ment.
Returning to the Jessel observation that the rules of courts of equity were
invented for the better administration of justice, it is manifest that a chancel-
lor's conscience will not only sedulously protect a plaintiff's interests against
irreparable injury; but, whenever occasion demands, will also guard against
oppressive, unreasonable or otherwise penalizing of a defendant under the
guise of awarding equitable relief. Consequently we find that where
acquiescence, laches, or cognate equitable elements tend to weaken or impair
a plaintiff's title to injunctive relief, the balance of convenience principle will
enter as a legitimate factor for consideration in the exercise of judicial discre-
tion.31 The importance of this rule is obvious when one bears in mind that
while harm done by improvident granting of a preliminary injunction might
be remedied by an action for malicious institution thereof; no action would lie
for an innocent mistake. 2 It is sometimes overlooked that the function of
29Cleveland v. Martin, 218 Ill. 73, 87 (1905); Philadelphia Ball Club Ltd. v. Laloie, 202
Pa. 210. 216 (1902).
813r. von Jherin, The Struggle for Law. (Lalor's transl.) 13.
SlHerr v. Central Kentucky Asylum, 110 Ky. 282 (1901); Stock v. City, 155 Mich. 375
(1909); McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N. Y. 301 (1914); Becker v. Lebanon St. Ry. Co..
188 Pa. 484 (1898): Baugh v. Bergdoll, 227 Pa. 422 (1910); Shelfer v. City of London Elec-
tric Lighting Co., (1925) 1 Ch. 287, 322, 323.
8 2City v. Sugar Refining Co., 221 N, Y, 206, 208 (1917).
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preliminary equitable relief is provident, cautionary, conservative, and prim-
arily preservative of the status quo. and while preventitive to some extent, is
seldom unqualifiedly remedial. In accordance with these principles it may be
noted that the consensus of enlightened professional opinion is to the effect
that the balance of convenience should be carefully considered before the
transcendent powers of equity are exercised or withheld where a decree is
prayed for on a doubtful question of law or fact. 3' Those who are wedded
to the formula method of dealing with jural problems may prefer to sum-
marize this and analogous rules by the statement: When in doubt about
equitable relief, balance the conveniences or inconveniences. Upon final
hearing, courts of equity govern themselves in accordance with the rights of
the parties regardless of questions of inconvenience."
Near the beginning of these notes it was set forth that where there has
been a wanton invasion of legal rights, irremediable at common law, the bal-
ance of convenience doctrine plays no part in equitable proceedings, as be-
tween the parties thereto. Where however a chancellor finds that a case is
complicated by an entanglement with public interests, he will sometimes re-
fuse equitable relief to the complainant on the ground that granting the decree
petitioned for would cause public inconvenience without furnishing any cor-
responding advantage to the plaintiff. Many note-writers trace the doctrine
of public convenience to an eighteenth century case in which Lord Hardwicke
refused to stay the erection of a small-pox hospital for the stated reason that
the contemplated institution "would be of great advantage to mankind."35
Such a principle involves danger of denying relief to an innocent party against
unjust or uncompensable injury by a willful or reckless wrongdoer. It is
submitted that the doctrine should be recognized only in cases of public
necessity. Otherwise there would arise the anomaly of treating a wrong-
doer as the champion of third parties or of the public, which has occasionally
33Park & Telford Corporation v. Hunter Baltimore Rye Inc., 5 Fed. Supp. 888 (S. D. N.
Y. 1933); Loomis vi Collins, 272 11. 221. 236 (1916); Hackensack Improvement Commission.
22 N. J. Eq. 94 1871); McCorkle v. Brem, 76 N. C. 407 (1877); Flippin v. Knaffle, 2 Tenn.
Chan. 238, 244 (1875); Oil & Gas Co. v. Cox, 5 S. W, (2d) 796 (Tex. 1928); Funk v. In-
land Power & Light Co., 1 Pac. (2d) 872. 874 (Wash. 1931); Bettman v. Harneson, 42 W.
Va. 433, 36 L. R. A. 566 (1896); Wilkinson v. Rogers, 12 W. R. 284, 285 (Eng. 1864):
Read v. Richardson, 45 L. T. 54, 57, 58, 59 (Eng. 1881); York Publishing Co. v. Coulter
Wayside Publishers Ltd., 24 0. W. R. 384 (Can. 1913); Playter v. Lucas, 69 D. L. R. 514
(Can. 1921).
84Tribune Assn. v. Simmonds, 104 At. 386, 389 (N. J. Ch. 1918); Citropa v. Colwunbu
Theater, 151 At. 467 (N. J. Ch. 1930).
35 Barnes v. Baker, Ambler, 158 (Eng. 1752).
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happened. Extreme misapplication or distortion of the balance of public con-
venience rule has sometimes sanctioned exploitation under the out-moded
policy of laissez-faire, as in the case of Daughtry v. Warren,36 wherein an in-
junction was refused against the flooding of the plaintiff's mill, with resulting
injury to the complainant's health, because, forsooth, the enterprise was "a
public utility." To paraphrase the language of Mr. Chief Justice Taft (then
a Circuit Court judge), in a case of a different nature; this principle should
not be applied when the sacrifice of the individual becomes so great that the
public good to be derived from it is outweighed.- 7 Thus where there has been
a willful continuance of a wrong, hardship and inconvenience to the public is
no bar to injunctive relief against violation of a patent right;38 nor would an
injunction against a municipality for wrongful discharge of sewage be re-
fused, although great inconvenience to the city would result from such recog-
nition's rights; 39 and taking property without compensation will be enjoined
irrespective of public convenience.4- Seeming exceptions which appear in
numerous reported decisions where public hardship or inconvenience has been
stressed as a ground for refusing equitable relief, could be supported by the
well settled principle that equity does not take jurisdiction of causes involving
merely consequential and incidental injury. This latter rule justifies a refusal
to enjoin the execution of an unconstitutional statute where no irreparable in-
jury is threatened;4" sanctions a denial of equitable relief against indirect
damage arising from the lawful operation of a public utility;42 supports a re-
fusal to grant an injunction against a municipal improvement on account of
consequential damages; 4 :1 and in general, will remit a complainant to an
action for damages wherever the harm done or threatened is small in scope or
easily remedied by compensatory damages. At one time there was a sugges-
tion that benefit to the public would be a complete defense for tortious con-
duct; but it has been settled that a commercial adventure for profit wherein
no indictment would lie for an undertaking to carry on an undertaking is not
sr85 N. C. 136 (1881).
37Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 16 U. S. App. 613, 653 (1893).
38Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 258, 263 (1898).
39Sammons v. City, 70 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1901).
40Chambers v. Railway Co., 69 Ga. 320 (1882); Storck v. Elevated Railway, 131 N. Y.
5, 14 (1892).
42Spiegel v. District Attorney, 5 Fed. Supp. 456, 457 .(1933);- Milton Dairy Co. v. Rail-
way Co., 124 Minn. 239 (1914).
42Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 171 (1924).
43Moore v. City, 70 Ga. 611, 615 (1883).
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a justification for tortious activity.44 At the same time it is observable that
where the conduct complained of is in furtherance of a public duty and
the plaintiff's damage proves to be small or occasional, and easily compen-
sated for in money, an injunction may be refused. 41 Accordingly the con-
struction or use of public utilities will not be enjoined unless the damage in-
flicted or threatened is both serious in amount and irreparable in character,
or the defendant is insolvent.
4
Analysis of numerous cases in which it has been held that a man's rights
must yield to public convenience, will reveal that the convenience referred to
substantially approximates or coincides with the principle of public necessity
or the policy of public welfare. Anything virtually short of this would run
counter to the weighty principle that a wrong and injury should not be con-
doned because of the importance of an undertaking. Thus we' find that
potential injury to public health and deprivation of water to cope with pos-
sible fires, constitute a substantial reason for denying an injunction against in-
terference with water rights.47  Likewise an injunction will be refused, where
the consequences of granting it would be : the dislocation of a public school
system48 interruption of traffic to the serious detriment of the public;40 or an
abandonment of municipal sanitary arrangements, where the injury to the
plaintiff, by refusal of an injunction, would be wholly financial.5 A very neat
illustration of a fair disposition of a case involving a question of public con-
venience is afforded by Schwartzenbach v. Oneonta Light & Power Co..5 in
which there was damage caused by the overflow of land due to the dam of an
electric light company. On the one hand there was presented a question of
public safety, for surely, to mention only one of many perils, a community
shrouded in darkness would be an Alsatia for criminals; while on the other
side there jutted the consideration that a flooding o'f land is a taking thereof. 2
The equities were balanced by granting an injunction against the trespass and
suspending the enforcement of the writ for a fixed period of time within which
44Imperial Gas Light & Coal Co. v. Broadbent, 7 H. L. C. 600, 610 (Eng. 1859).
45Raymond v. Transit Development Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 655 (1909).
4"Jones v. Lassiter, 169 N. C. 750 (1915).
47Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. City, 67 Ore. 381, 136 Pac. 29 (1913).
4sEdinboro Normal School v. Cooper, 150 Pa. 78 (1892).
49Torrey v. Railroad, 18 N. 1. Eq. 293, 297 (1867).
50 Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U. S. 334, 339 (1933).
51129 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1911), modified in 207 N. Y. 671 (1912).
52Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U. S. 166, 178 (1871).
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the defendant would have an opportunity of abating the injury. In conclud-
ing these notes, it is submitted that the trend of the decisions is to the effect
that the "collective juridical conscience ' ' 5 3 of chancellors is opposed to oppres-
sion, either by improvident exercise of the drastic powers of equity, or by re-
fusal of relief against unprovoked and irreparable injury.
531 am indebted to Salleilles for the phrase contained in quotation marks.
